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355 
Abbott v. Abbott: An Overly Broad Conclusion as to 
Whether Ne Exeat Provisions Create Rights of 
Custody Under the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction 
EVE PACHTER
†
 
 
 
 
In Abbott v. Abbott,1 the Supreme Court of the United States 
considered whether a non-custodial father‘s ne exeat right,2 granted 
by the Chilean family court, constituted a ―right of custody,‖ as 
defined under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction (Hague Convention).3 The Court 
ultimately held that the father‘s ne exeat right amounted to a ―right of 
custody.‖4 Therefore, the mother‘s wrongful removal of the son 
violated the Hague Convention,5 allowing the father to seek the 
treaty‘s right of return remedy.6 Furthermore, the Court held that ne 
 
† Senior Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2011–2012; J.D., University of 
Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, May 2012. Thank you to all of the faculty, 
staff, and members of the executive board of the Maryland Journal of International Law 
who assisted with this article. I would also like to thank my family for their endless support 
and encouragement. 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).  
 2. A ne exeat writ restrains a person from leaving a court‘s jurisdiction. BLACK‘S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1061 (8th ed. 2004). A ne exeat writ is often used to prohibit a person from 
removing a child or property from the jurisdiction. Id. 
 3. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1987. The Convention defines ―rights of custody‖ to ―include 
rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine 
the child‘s place of residence.‖ Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction art. 5(a), Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter 
Hague Convention]. 
 4. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1993.  
 5. See id. at 1990. 
 6. Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 12 (requiring the judicial or administrative 
authority of a state party to order the return of a child abducted in violation of a parent‘s 
rights of custody). 
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exeat rights always constitute ―rights of custody‖ under the Hague 
Convention.7 
Although the Court purported to render a judgment that aligned 
with the underlying objectives of the Hague Convention, the majority 
opinion improperly generalized the question presented8 and failed to 
consider the varying contexts in which international courts have 
applied ne exeat rights.9 By doing so, the Court reached a conclusion 
that is overly broad and runs counter to the objectives of the Hague 
Convention.10  
I. THE CASE 
Petitioner, Timothy Abbott, and respondent, Jacquelyn Abbott, 
married in 1992.11 The couple‘s son, A.J.A. was born in Hawaii in 
1995.12 In 2002, the Abbotts moved to La Serena, Chile.13 
Subsequently, the couple separated in March of 2003, and sought 
child custody arrangements in the Chilean family court.14 The court 
granted Ms. Abbott with sole custody rights of A.J.A and awarded 
Mr. Abbott specific ―direct‖ and ―regular‖ visitation rights.15  
Under Chilean law, once a parent is granted visitation rights, a 
ne exeat right automatically follows.16 Yet, even with this statutory 
provision in place, Ms. Abbott sought an additional ne exeat order 
from the court.17 On January 13, 2004, the court granted Ms. 
 
 7. See Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1993, 1995.  
 8. See infra Part IV.A. 
 9. See infra Part IV.B. 
 10. See infra Part IV.C.  
 11. Abbott v. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d 635, 637 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d 542 F.3d 1081 
(5th Cir. 2008), rev’d 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. The district court noted that, ―careful review of the record reveals that the Chilean 
family court granted all care and custody rights to Ms. Abbott, despite Mr. Abbott‘s petitions 
to the courts for custody of his son.‖ Id. at 637 n.2. 
 16. James D. Garbolino, The United States Supreme Court Settles the Ne Exeat 
Controversy in America: Abbott v. Abbott, 59 INT‘L & COMP. L. QUART. 1158, 1159 (2010) 
(citing Minors Law 16, 618, art. 49 (Chile)). The Chilean Minors Law prohibits a parent 
from permanently removing a child from Chile without the consent of the parent with 
visitation rights. Id.  
 17. Id.  
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Abbott‘s request, prohibiting either parent from removing the child 
from Chile without their mutual consent.18  
In August of 2005, Ms. Abbott removed A.J.A. from Chile 
without the permission of Mr. Abbott or the Chilean Family Court, 
while custody proceedings before the court were still pending.19 Ms. 
Abbott and A.J.A. were eventually located in Texas where Mr. 
Abbott filed an action claiming that A.J.A. was wrongfully removed 
from Chile in violation of the Hague Convention.20 
The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Texas denied Mr. Abbott the return remedy that he sought under the 
Hague Convention.21 In doing so, the court held that Mr. Abbott‘s ne 
exeat right did not constitute a right of custody under the Hague 
Convention and, therefore, Ms. Abbott‘s removal of A.J.A. from 
Chile was not ―wrongful‖ as defined by the treaty.22 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower 
court‘s decision, also focusing on the Hague Convention‘s clear 
distinction between rights of access and rights of custody.23  
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Overview of the Convention 
The issue of international child abduction did not garner 
significant attention from the international community until the late 
1970s when international travel became more frequent and, 
consequently, the number of international marriages increased.24 This 
 
 18. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 637.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 641. 
 22. Id. (―The Hague Convention explicitly creates a different set of remedies for those 
parents whose rights of access are frustrated by the custodial parent‘s removal of a child 
from the child‘s country of habitual residence‖). Compare Hague Convention, supra note 3, 
art. 5(a) (defining ―rights of custody‖ to include ―the right to determine the child‘s place of 
residence) with id. art. 5(b) (defining ―rights of access,‖ to include the ―right to take a child 
for a limited period of time to place other than the child‘s habitual residence‖). 
 23. Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081, 1088 (5th Cir. 2008), rev’d 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010). 
―Mr. Abbott‘s rights of access, however enhanced and protected by the ne exeat order, is 
simply not sufficient to create rights of custody that warrant the greater protection intended 
under the Hague Convention.‖ Id. at 1087.  
 24. Tai Vivatvaraphol, Back to Basics: Determining a Child’s Habitual Residence in 
International Child Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3325, 3330–31 (2009).  
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development, in conjunction with the rising rate of divorces and 
separations, resulted in a noticeable increase in international child 
custody disputes.25 In attempting to handle cases of this nature, a 
number of problems became evident such as locating the child, the 
high costs associated with international disputes, and the 
unwillingness of foreign and local authorities to provide assistance.26  
Complications were further compounded by the fact that some 
courts adjudicating international child abduction cases applied the 
best-interests-of-the-child standard.27 This amorphous and 
individualized standard resulted in unpredictable outcomes,28 which 
were, at times, influenced by the particular country‘s societal mores 
regarding child rearing.29 Those courts that chose to utilize a different 
mode of analysis still posed problems for parents involved in 
international child abduction disputes, since many of these courts 
exhibited a gender bias.30 Moreover, the left-behind parent was 
typically obligated to seek a judicial remedy in the country in which 
the abducted child was located.31 Often the laws of this country 
differed from the laws of the left-behind parent‘s own country.32 The 
resulting phenomenon included inconsistent and non-uniform 
judgments handed down by international courts.33 Furthermore, the 
situation provided a perverse incentive for parents to remove a child 
to another country in order to obtain a more favorable legal custody 
judgment than they would have received in their own country.34  
In March of 1979, a Special Commission was convened to 
examine these problems relating to international child abduction.35 
The Hague Convention was adopted by a unanimous vote on October 
 
 25. Id. at 3331. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 3332. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. (citing Paul R. Beumont & Peter E. McEleavy, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 2 (1999)).  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 3333. 
 34. See id. at 3336 (―[T]he Child Abduction Convention discourages parents from 
unilaterally removing their children in order to use them as instruments to obtain a 
convenient and favorable forum in which to air their custody disputes.‖). 
 35. Thompson v. Thompson, [1994] 10 W.W.R. 513, 531 (S.C.C.) (Can.). 
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25, 1980.36 Its stated purpose is ―to protect children internationally 
from the harmful effects of their removal or retention and to establish 
procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual 
residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access.‖37 Thus, 
the framers of the Hague Convention intended to deter the practice of 
international child abductions.38  
The Hague Convention mandates that a child‘s return occur 
when a ―wrongful removal‖ or retention is found.39 According to the 
Hague Convention, a ―wrongful removal‖ occurs where: 
a) [I]t is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a 
person, institution or another body, either jointly or 
alone, under the law of the State in which the child was 
habitually resident immediately before the removal or 
retention; and 
b) At the time of removal or retention those rights were 
actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would 
have been so exercised but for the removal or 
retention.40  
The Hague Convention further defines ―rights of custody‖ to 
―include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in 
particular, the right to determine the child‘s place of residence.‖41 On 
the other hand, rights of access, which, if violated, do not constitute a 
wrongful removal under the Hague Convention, include the ―right to 
 
 36. Vivatvaraphol, supra note 24, at 3334. The United States became a signatory to the 
Hague Convention on December 23, 1981. Id. at 3339. On April 29, 1988, the United States 
implemented the Hague Convention when Congress enacted International Child Abduction 
Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
11601–11 (2006)). The act requires that in any action brought under the Hague Convention 
for the return of a child, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the child has been wrongfully removed or retained. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e) (2006). 
 37. Hague Convention, supra note 3, pmbl.  
 38. Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road Between Uniformity and Progress: The Need 
for Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275, 289 (2002). 
 39. Hague Convention, supra note 3, arts. 3, 12. 
 40. Id. art. 3. 
 41. Id. art. 5(a). 
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take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the 
child‘s habitual residence.‖42  
Importantly, the Hague Convention does not address, nor does it 
seek to address, which party is legally entitled to custody of the 
abducted child.43 Rather, the Hague Convention solely addresses in 
what jurisdiction the custody dispute should be adjudicated.44 For this 
reason, courts deciding a case under the Hague Convention may only 
consider the claim of wrongful removal and not the merits of the 
underlying case.45 
While the historical problems leading to the Hague Convention‘s 
ratification are clear, the context in which remedies under the Hague 
Convention are now being sought have significantly changed since 
the Hague Convention‘s initial ratification.46 In particular, many of 
the recent U.S. cases decided pursuant to the Hague Convention 
involved situations of domestic violence.47 These cases typically 
entail a mother who is the primary caretaker abducting the child and 
alleging she was a victim of domestic violence.48  
Significantly, the Hague Convention was not drafted with such 
scenarios in mind.49 The Hague Convention was originally 
introduced ―to discourage abductions by parents who had lost, or 
would lose, a custody contest‖ from removing their children to other 
countries in the hope of obtaining a more favorable judgment.50 
Therefore, ―the abductor was not traditionally thought to be the 
 
 42. Id. art. 5(b). ―[T]he Convention leaves the enforcement of access rights to the 
administrative channels of Central Authorities designated by the state parties to the 
Convention.‖ Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 10 W.W.R. 513, 533 (Can.). 
 43. Vivatvaraphol, supra note 24, at 3335. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Weiner, supra note 37, at 278–80. 
 47. Id. at 277 (―Seven of the nine cases decided by the United States courts of appeals 
between July 2000 and January 2001 involved an abductor who alleged that she was a victim 
of domestic violence.‖).  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 278. Although the context in which the Hague Convention is now being 
applied has shifted, the treaty does contain a provision maintaining that: 
the judicial or administrative authority of the requested state is not bound to order 
the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its 
return establishes that there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the 
child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an 
intolerable situation.‖  
Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 13(b). 
 50. Weiner, supra note 37, at 278. 
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primary caretaker.‖51 This contextual shift has, in effect, required that 
the Hague Convention operate in the inverse function of the 
originally intended applicable scenario.52 Although this contextual 
modification may appear minor, the variation has impacted many 
courts charged with the task of interpreting the Convention.53 
Specifically, ―while the return remedy works well if the abductor is a 
non-custodial parent, it is inappropriate when the abductor is a 
primary caretaker who is seeking to protect herself and the child from 
the other parent‘s violence.‖54  
III. U.S. CASE LAW EXAMINING WHETHER A NE EXEAT RIGHT 
CONSTITUTES A RIGHT OF CUSTODY UNDER THE CONVENTION  
Abbott v. Abbott was the first United States Supreme Court case 
to interpret the Hague Convention since the underlying issue is a 
family law dispute, an area of law traditionally reserved for state 
courts.55 Moreover, United States Circuit Courts were equally divided 
on the issue of whether a ne exeat provision constituted a right of 
custody under the Hague Convention.56 Therefore, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in an attempt to resolve the circuit court split 
on the issue.57  
Four federal circuit courts, other than the circuit court in Abbott, 
have ruled on the issue of whether a ne exeat right creates a right of 
custody under the Hague Convention.58 In Croll v. Croll,59 the 
Second Circuit held that a ne exeat right ―does not transmute access 
rights into rights of custody under the Convention.‖60 A family court 
in Hong Kong had granted Mrs. Croll with ―sole custody, care, and 
 
 51. Id.  
 52. See id. at 278–79. 
 53. Id. at 279 (―In some of the recent decisions, courts have adopted novel legal 
interpretations in an effort to avoid applying the Convention to these abductors.‖). 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 282. 
 56. See infra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
 57. Martha Bailey, Abbott v. Abbott: Do Ne Exeat Provisions Create Rights of 
Custody?, 29 CAN. FAM L.Q. 171, 177 (2010). 
 58. Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702 (11th Cir. 2004); Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 
491 (4th Cir. 2003), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010); Gonzalez v. 
Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 
(2010); Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. 
Ct. 1983 (2010). 
 59. 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).  
 60. Id. at 143. 
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control‖ of the child and granted the father a right of ―reasonable 
access.‖61 Based on these facts, the Second Circuit denied Mr. Croll‘s 
request for his daughter‘s return to Hong Kong, finding that Mr. 
Croll‘s rights, even including the ne exeat clause, did not include the 
powers of a custodial parent.62  
The Ninth Circuit held similarly in Gonzalez v. Gutierrez63 when 
it concluded that ―a ne exeat right serves only to allow a parent with 
access rights to impose a limitation on the custodial parent‘s right to 
expatriate the child.‖64 In Gonzalez, Rosa Teresa Gutierrez and 
Eduardo Arce Gonzalez sought to obtain a divorce in Mexico.65 
Gutierrez alleged that Eduardo repeatedly physically and verbally 
abused her during their marriage.66 In August 2000, the divorce was 
granted. According to the divorce agreement, Gutierrez and Arce‘s 
minor children were to ―remain under the sole custody and care of 
their mother.‖67 Arce, on the other hand, was granted visitation 
rights.68 The divorce agreement also stipulated that Arce ―must grant 
full authorization . . . on every occasion that his minor children . . . 
seek to leave the country.‖69  
In holding that the ne exeat clause in the custody agreement 
failed to constitute a right of custody under the Hague Convention, 
the court focused on the fact that the explicit terms of the divorce 
agreement, which was approved by the Mexican family court, 
granted sole custody to Ms. Gutierrez.70 The court also determined 
that Arce‘s ability to deny permission for his children to leave 
Mexico did not amount to a right of custody because Arce could not 
determine, with any specificity, where the children would reside 
within Mexico or even outside of Mexico.71  
 
 61. Id. at 135. 
 62. Id. at 143–44. ―The right granted under a ne exeat clause is, at most, a veto power.‖ 
Id. at 140. 
 63. 311 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 
(2010). 
 64. Id. at 949. 
 65. Id. at 946. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 947. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 950. 
 71. Id. at 949. 
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Although examining the issue in a slightly different context, the 
Fourth Circuit in Fawcett v. McRoberts echoed the conclusions in 
Croll and Gonzalez, holding that a ne exeat right does not constitute a 
right of custody under the Hague Convention.72 In Fawcett, the 
parties had married in Scotland in 1986.73 While married, the couple 
had two children, although custody regarding only one of the children 
was in dispute.74 In 1998, a Scottish Court issued a divorce decree 
requiring that the child live with Mr. McRoberts and providing 
visitation rights to Ms. Fawcett.75 Ms. Fawcett became increasingly 
concerned that Mr. McRoberts might take their son to the United 
States.76 Therefore, she sought an order from the court preventing 
Mr. McRoberts from removing the child from Scotland, which the 
court granted.77 
Like in Gonzalez, the court‘s holding in Fawcett also rested upon 
an examination of the actual language in the couple‘s divorce decree. 
Specifically, the ―Residence Order‖ in the decree gave ―Mr. 
McRoberts the exclusive power to determine [the child‘s] 
residence.‖78 The court also found the reasoning of the courts in 
Gonzalez and Croll to be sufficiently persuasive.79 
By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite 
conclusion in Furnes v. Reeves80 when it held that a non-custodial 
parent‘s ne exeat right does establish a right of custody.81 The court 
based much of its decision on the fact that the Hague Convention 
does not specifically define the phrase ―place of residence.‖82 
Therefore, a parent‘s ne exeat right to determine whether the child 
lives inside or outside the state can conceivably constitute the right to 
determine a child‘s place of residence.83 Based on this interpretation, 
 
 72. Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491, 500 (4th Cir. 2003), abrogated by Abbott v. 
Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010) (holding that Scottish family law that permits non-custodial 
parents to maintain relations and direct contact with the child did not create rights of custody 
under the Hague Convention).  
 73. Id. at 492. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 493. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 499. 
 79. Id. at 500. 
 80. 362 F.3d 702 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 81. Id. at 716.  
 82. Id. at 715–16. 
 83. See id. at 715. 
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the court concluded that the parent did have ―rights of custody‖ in 
accordance with the Hague Convention.84 
B. Foreign Case Law Examining Whether a Ne Exeat Right 
Constitutes a Right of Custody Under the Convention  
Despite the lack of United States Supreme Court precedent 
involving the Hague Convention, many high courts in foreign 
countries have previously interpreted the treaty.85 Moreover, a 
number of these courts have been faced with the specific issue of 
whether a ne exeat provision constitutes a ―right of custody‖ under 
the Hague Convention.86  
Canada was one of the first countries ratify the Hague 
Convention.87 For this reason, the Supreme Court of Canada‘s 
opinions were persuasive value for many other signatory countries to 
the treaty.88 In Thomson v. Thomson,89 the Supreme Court of Canada 
was required to examine the effect of an interim custody order 
prohibiting the mother from removing her child from Scotland.90 The 
parties in Thomson were involved in a custody dispute in Scotland.91 
A report produced during the dispute indicated that the mother was 
the more suitable parent.92 Consequently, the Sheriff granted the 
mother interim custody of the child and granted the father with 
interim access to the child.93 The Sheriff also ordered that the child 
―remain in Scotland pending a further court order.‖ 94 Despite the 
order, the mother took the child to Manitoba where she filed a 
petition seeking custody of the child.95  
 
 84. Id. 
 85. See infra notes 87–105 and accompanying text. 
 86. See infra notes 87–105 and accompanying text. 
 87. Martha Bailey, Canada’s Implementation of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 17, 17 (2000). 
 88. The case of Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 10 W.W.R. 513 (S.C.C.), in particular, is 
referenced by numerous U.S. courts determining whether a ne exeat provision confers a right 
of custody under the Child Abduction Convention. E.g., Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 143 
(2d Cir. 2000), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott. 
 89. [1994] 10 W.W.R. 513 (S.C.C.).  
 90. Id. at 518. 
 91. Id. at 519. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. The Scottish Court inserted the non-removal clause in the interim custody order 
to preserve its jurisdiction to decide the issue of custody on its merits later. Id. at 514. 
 95. Id. at 519. 
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As in many of the cases involving the Hague Convention, the 
Supreme Court of Canada was required to determine whether the 
removal of Matthew from Scotland constituted a breach of the 
father‘s custody rights.96 Ultimately, the Court held that ―[t]he 
appellant's removal of Matthew . . . constituted a breach of the 
custody right of the Scottish court within the meaning of Article 3 of 
the Hague Convention.‖97 In doing so, the Court recognized the 
significance in Canadian law of a non-removal clause contained in an 
interim custody order.98 The significance being that such a provision 
is specifically included in order to preserve the court‘s jurisdiction to 
determine the parent‘s final custody arrangement.99 Notably, in dicta, 
the court stated that a ne exeat clause in a permanent custody order 
may be construed differently than a non-removal clause in an interim 
custody order.100  
Other foreign courts have been forced to examine the issue of 
whether ne exeat rights constitute rights of custody, although in 
different contexts. In C. v. C.,101 the English Court of Appeals ruled 
on a case involving a couple from Australia.102 Upon the couple‘s 
separation, the deputy registrar of the Family Court in Sydney made a 
consent order that gave the mother custody of the child, but kept both 
parents as joint guardians.103 Clause two of the Consent Order 
provided that neither party should remove the child from Australia 
without the consent of the other.104 However, approximately two 
years later, the mother took the child to England without obtaining 
the father‘s consent.105  
 
 96. Id. at 536. 
 97. See id. at 540. ―[I]t seems clear that the non-removal clause was inserted into the 
custody order of November 27, 1992 to preserve jurisdiction in the Scottish court to decide 
the issue of custody on its merits in a full hearing at a later date.‖ Id. 
 98. Id. at 540. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 540–41. Justice La Forest elaborated: 
It will be observed that I have underlined the purely interim nature of the mother‘s 
custody in the present case. I would not wish to be understood as saying the 
approach should be the same in a situation where a court inserts a non-removal 
clause in a permanent order of custody. Such a clause raises quite different issues. 
Id. at 540. 
 101. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 654 (A.C.). 
 102. Id. at 656. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. 
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The Court of Appeals found that under the Hague Convention 
the father possessed a right of custody, which was breached by the 
mother‘s wrongful removal of the child from Australia to England.106 
Therefore, the court ordered the child‘s return to Australia in order to 
allow the Australian court to decide with which parent the child 
should live.107 In reaching this conclusion, the court held that ―the 
father does not have the right to determine the child‘s place of 
residence within Australia but has the right to ensure that the child 
remains in Australia, or lives anywhere outside Australia only with 
his approval.‖108 The court further determined that this right fell 
within the purview of the Hague Convention‘s ―right of custody,‖ 
because ―the [Hague] Convention must be interpreted so that within 
its scope it is to be effective.‖109 
Other foreign courts have agreed with the English Court of 
Appeals decision in C v. C. For example, the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa in Sonderup v. Tondelli,110 held that a mother‘s removal 
of her daughter from Canada, and retention in South Africa, was 
wrongful under the Hague Convention.111 Sonderup involved a 
couple that had married in South Africa, but subsequently filed for 
divorce in Canada.112 The Supreme Court of British Columbia 
granted a consent order, the terms of which provided that the mother 
would have full custody of the child and the father have rights of 
access.113 Moreover, the consent order provided that, ―neither the 
plaintiff (the father) nor the defendant (the mother) shall remove the 
child from the Province of British Columbia without further Court 
order or the written agreement of the parties.‖114 Approximately a 
year later, the father sought an urgent order from the court stipulating 
 
 106. Id. at 658. 
 107. Id. at 659–60. 
 108. Id. at 658. 
 109. Id. 
 110. 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 111. Id. at 1183. 
 112. Id. at 1177. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. The consent order also provided that neither parent would remove the child from 
Canada without a court order or written agreement ―except that either party will be permitted 
to travel outside of British Columbia with the child once per year for a period not to exceed 
30 days.‖ Furthermore, ―[I]f the child is taken out of Canada for a period exceeding 30 days, 
without further Court order or written consent of both parties . . . the child have been [sic] 
wrongfully removed . . . in contravention of the [Hague] Convention . . . .‖ Id. 
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that the mother refrain from removing the child from Canada.115 
Despite this order, the mother removed the child from Canada to 
South Africa, where they moved in with the mother‘s family.116 
The Constitutional Court found that the mother wrongfully 
removed the child in violation of the Hague Convention because the 
parties had entered into an interim agreement stipulating that the 
child would be returned to Canada on a specific date.117 Therefore, 
the court was not ―dealing only with a non-removal provision in a 
final custody agreement,‖ such as the agreement present before the 
court in Croll.118 For these reasons, the Court ordered that the child 
be returned to Canada.119 
C. Summary of Court’s Reasoning 
In Abbott v. Abbott, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the 
Hague Convention for the first time.120 The question before the Court 
was whether a non-custodial parent‘s ne exeat right conferred a ―right 
of custody‖ within the meaning of the Hague Convention, thus 
allowing Mr. Abbott to bring a cause of action against Ms. Abbott for 
―wrongful removal of the child.‖121 Ultimately, the Court held that 
Mr. Abbott‘s ne exeat right did, in fact, constitute a ―right of 
custody‖ under the Hague Convention, and therefore, Ms. Abbott 
―wrongfully removed‖ A.J.A. in violation of the treaty.122 
In reaching its decision, the Court first examined the text of the 
treaty.123 Specifically, the Court analyzed Article 5 of the Hague 
Convention, which defines rights of custody as including rights 
relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the 
right to determine the child‘s place of residence.124 The underlying 
question presented for the Court was under what context a parent 
 
 115. Id. at 1178. The order responding to the father‘s request stated that ―[t]he defendant 
(the mother) be allowed to travel to South Africa with the child, for a one-month period . . . 
returning July 14, 2000.‖ Id.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 1182. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 1191. 
 120. Garbolino, supra note 16, at 1158.  
 121. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1987. 
 122. Id. at 1990. 
 123. Id. at 1989. 
 124. Id. (citing Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 5). 
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determines the child‘s place of residence.125 The Court concluded that 
Mr. Abbott‘s ne exeat right conferred a right to determine A.J.A‘s 
place of residence since Mr. Abbott‘s approval was needed before the 
child was allowed to leave the country.126 In exercising this right, Mr. 
Abbott jointly participated in deciding the country in which A.J.A. 
must reside.127 Hence, a determination by Mr. Abbott that his son had 
to reside in the country of Chile stood for a determination as to the 
child‘s residence.128 More generally, the Court concluded that ―ne 
exeat rights are rights of custody.‖129 
In support of this conclusion, the Court offered the State 
Department‘s Office of Children‘s Issues‘ interpretation that ne exeat 
clauses confer rights of custody within the meaning of the Hague 
Convention.130 The Court emphasized the role of the Executive 
branch in this matter, explaining that the Executive has valuable 
information and experience in treaty interpretation.131 For this reason, 
the Court found it appropriate to defer to the Executive branch‘s 
expertise when analyzing the particular issues presented by the case. 
132 
Next, the Court turned its attention to support from other 
signatory countries to the Hague Convention.133 The Court justified 
this analysis by noting that the ―Congress has directed that ‗uniform 
international interpretation of the Convention‘ is part of its 
framework.‖134 The Court then specified that other countries have 
accepted the rule that ne exeat rights confer rights of custody within 
the Hague Convention‘s meaning.135 The Court further noted that 
there is even great scholarship and academic support on this position 
 
 125. See Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1990–91. ―The phrase place of residence‖ encompasses the 
child‘s country of residence, especially in light of the Convention‘s explicit purpose to 
prevent wrongful removal across international borders.‖ Id.  
 126. Id. at 1990. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1991. 
 129. See id. at 1993. ―This Court‘s conclusion that ne exeat rights are rights of custody is 
further informed by the views of other contracting states.‖ Id. ―A review of the international 
case law confirms broad acceptance of the rule that ne exeat rights are rights of custody.‖ Id. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1993–94. 
 134. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3)(B) (2006)). 
 135. Id. The Court specifically mentioned England, Israel, Austria, South Africa, 
Germany and Scotland. Id. 
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regarding whether ne exeat provisions can elicit the powerful return 
remedy under the Hague Convention.136 
Lastly, the Court focused on the Hague Convention‘s objectives 
and concluded that its holding remained true to the treaty‘s objects 
and purposes.137 In fact, the Court noted that denying the father‘s 
request for the child‘s return under the Hague Convention ―would run 
counter to the Convention‘s purpose of deterring child abductions by 
parents who attempt to find a friendlier forum for deciding custodial 
disputes.‖138 And, finally, the Court maintained that the Perez-Vera 
Report139 supported the conclusion that the Hague Convention 
contemplated ne exeat rights conferring rights of custody, by virtue 
of the framers‘ intention that the term ―rights of custody‖ be 
interpreted in a manner as expansive as possible.140 
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, focused on defining the 
true meaning of custody rights in addition to drawing a clear and 
demarcated distinction between rights of custody and rights of 
access.141 In particular, he emphasized the fact that the Hague 
Convention provides for different remedies depending on which right 
the abducting parent violates.142 
The dissent also focused much of its opinion on the underlying 
purpose of the Hague Convention by, in a similar manner to the 
majority, carefully scrutinizing the treaty‘s text.143 The dissent began 
by providing a historical context for the Hague Convention.144 
Specifically, Justice Stevens noted that the drafters convened to 
determine ―an international solution to an emerging problem: 
transborder child abductions perpetrated by noncustodial parents to 
establish artificial jurisdictional links . . . with a view to obtain 
 
 136. Id. at 1994. 
 137. Id. at 1995. 
 138. Id. at 1996. 
 139. The Perez-Vera Report contains the legislative history of the Convention. ELISA 
PEREZ-VERA, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE 1980 HAGUE CHILD ABDUCTION CONVENTION 
426 (1982), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf [hereinafter PEREZ-VERA 
REPORT].  
 140. See Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1995 (citing PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 139, at 447– 
48).  
 141. Id. at 1998 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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custody of the child.‖145 With this setting in mind, the dissent stated 
that the Hague Convention‘s purpose was to ―protect children from 
wrongful international removals or retention by persons bent on 
obtaining their physical and/or legal custody.‖146 Based on this 
purpose, the dissent articulated the change in context where the 
custodial parent was removing the child from his country of habitual 
residence—an instance not intended to be covered by the Hague 
Convention.147 In light of this analysis, the dissent concluded that Mr. 
Abbott‘s right to ―veto the other parent‘s decision to remove the child 
from the country‖ did not amount to a right of custody as defined 
under the Hague Convention.148 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Court in Abbott v. Abbott improperly generalized the 
question presented.149 In doing so, the Court reached an overly broad 
conclusion that failed to take into account the varying contexts in 
which ne exeat rights are applied.150 Ultimately, the Court‘s decision 
does not comport with the objects and purposes of the Hague 
Convention.151 The Court should have limited the scope of its 
decision solely to whether Mr. Abbott‘s rights of custody, solely in 
this case, were violated under the Hague Convention, rather than 
holding that ne exeat rights always constitute ―rights of custody.‖152 
A. The Court Improperly Framed the Issue by Posing an Overly 
General Question Presented 
In Abbott, the Court inappropriately framed the issue by over-
generalizing the question presented. The Court initially posed the 
question as ―whether a parent has a ‗right of custody‘ by reason of 
that parent‘s ne exeat right: the authority to consent before the other 
parent may take the child to another country?‖153 Thus, the Court 
posed the question in a more universal, rather than case-specific, 
manner.  
 
 145. Id. (citing PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 139, at 426) (internal citations omitted). 
 146. Id.  
 147. See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text. 
 148. Id. at 1999. 
 149. See infra Part IV.A. 
 150. See infra Part IV.B. 
 151. See infra Part IV.C. 
 152. See infra Part IV.A. 
 153. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1987. 
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The Court later narrowed the issue when it stated: ―The question 
is whether A.J.A. was ‗wrongfully removed‘ from Chile, in other 
words, whether he was removed in violation of a right of custody?‖154 
Yet, the Court ultimately concluded not only that ―Mr. Abbott 
possesse[d] a right of custody under the Hague Convention,‖ but also 
that ―ne exeat rights are rights of custody.‖155 Additionally, the Court 
held that ―the joint right to decide a child‘s country of residence is 
not even arguably a . . . visitation right.‖156 The Court, consequently, 
did not merely render a decision as to whether Mr. Abbott‘s ne exeat 
right constituted a ―right of custody‖ under the Hague Convention, 
but declared that all ne exeat rights amount to a ―right of custody.‖ 
Courts in other countries faced with cases brought under the 
Hague Convention have more appropriately narrowed the question 
presented and, therefore, rendered a decision based on the specific 
facts contained in the dispute. In Sonderup, for example, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa stated that the issues before the 
Court were the following: ―1) whether the provisions of the 
Convention apply in the present case; 2) if so, whether, as 
incorporated by the Act, they are consistent with the Constitution, 
and; 3) whether these provisions require the return of [the child].‖157 
Similarly, in C v. C, the Court of Appeal stated that the specific 
question is ―whether under Australian law clause 2 was capable of 
constituting a right of custody within the Convention.‖158 Finally, in 
Thomson, the Court articulated the principal question as whether ―the 
child should be returned to Scotland under the terms of the 
Convention.‖159 
By posing the question presented in such a universal manner, the 
Court in Abbott failed to properly narrow its analysis to the facts 
specific to the case at hand. As a result, the Court engaged in a 
general analysis of whether ne exeat rights constitute rights of 
custody under the Hague Convention rather than appropriately 
analyzing whether Mr. Abbott‘s rights, alone, constituted rights of 
custody under the Hague Convention.  
 
 154. Id. at 1990. 
 155. Id. at 1993. 
 156. Id. at 1992. 
 157. 2001 (1) SA 1171, 1181 (CC). (S. Afr.).  
 158. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 654, 657–58 (A.C.). 
 159. [1994] 10 W.W.R. 513, 518 (Can.). 
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B. Foreign Courts Have Applied Ne Exeat Rights in Various 
Contexts 
By examining the issue generally, the Court failed to take into 
account the differing contexts in which ne exeat provisions can be 
applied. Even a superficial examination of the cases referenced in the 
Abbott decision indicates that ne exeat rights are utilized by foreign 
courts in a variety of circumstances. For example, in the leading case 
of Thomson, the Supreme Court of Canada examined an interim 
custody order, which specified non-removal of the child from 
Scotland pending a further court order.160 As previously noted, under 
Canadian law, this non-removal provision has the effect of preserving 
the court‘s jurisdiction to determine the final custody arrangement.161 
The Supreme Court of Canada explained that it was forced to 
compare the non-removal provision to Canadian law because no 
evidence was put forth regarding the legal effect of this provision 
under Scottish law.162 
On the other hand, in Sonderup, the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa examined a final custody order as well as an interim 
agreement.163 Specifically, the Court noted that ―[h]ere, we are not 
dealing only with a non-removal provision in a final custody 
agreement . . . [i]n this case we have an interim agreement between 
the parties that [the child] would be returned to her country of 
habitual residence by a particular date.‖164  
Finally, in C v. C, the Court of Appeal in England examined a 
final consent order.165 Specifically, the order stipulated that: 
(1) The mother . . . have custody of . . . the child of the 
marriage and [that both] the [father] and the [mother] 
. . . remain joint guardians of the said child. (2) 
[Neither] the [father] nor the [mother] shall remove the 
child from Australia without the consent of the 
other.166  
 
 160. Id. at 540.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Id.  
 163. 2001 (1) SA 1171, 1177-78 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 164. Id. at 1182. 
 165. See [1989] 1 W.L.R. 654, 657 (A.C.). 
 166. Id. at 656. 
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Therefore, the situation in C v. C differed markedly from the cases of 
Thomson and Sonderup in that the final consent order explicitly 
stated that the parents were to remain joint guardians of the child. 
These courts have even noted the varying contexts in which ne 
exeat rights are applied. In particular, the South African 
Constitutional Court in Sonderup stated that, ―[i]t has been held by 
courts in several jurisdictions that such a non-removal provision can, 
depending on the circumstances, confer a right of custody within the 
meaning of the Convention.‖167 The Canadian Supreme Court in 
Thomson further clarified what these differing circumstances may 
entail when it emphasized ―the purely interim nature of the mother‘s 
custody in the present case,‖168 and explained that the Court‘s 
approach would differ if the facts involved a non-removal clause in a 
permanent custody order.169 The Court clarified the distinction 
further by stipulating that a non-removal clause in a permanent 
custody order ―is usually intended to ensure permanent access to the 
non-custodial parent,‖ but ―not intended to be given the same level of 
protection by the Convention as custody.‖170  
The Court in Abbott failed to truly consider the varying contexts 
in which ne exeat rights may be applied. However, the Court briefly 
referenced this reality when it noted that ―[t]his Court need not 
decide the status of ne exeat orders lacking parent consent 
provisions.‖171 Although it seems that the Court accepted that ne 
exeat rights might be included in custody dispute orders for a variety 
of different reasons, the Court failed to take this fact into account and 
instead broadly concluded that ne exeat rights always constitute 
rights of custody under the Hague Convention. 
 
 
 
 
 167. 2001 (1) SA at 1182 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). 
 168. [1994] 10 W.W.R. 513, 540 (Can.). 
 169. Id. at 540–41. 
 170. Id. ―I agree that the insertion of a non-removal clause in a permanent order of 
custody does not result in a right of custody being retained by the court and therefore does 
not result in a wrongful removal, as defined in the Convention, in circumstances where the 
custodial parent moves with the child to a new jurisdiction.‖ Id. at 553. 
 171. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1992. 
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C. The Interpretation of Ne Exeat Rights Requires a Context 
Specific Analysis in All Cases 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Abbott, along with other high courts 
in other countries,172 stressed the importance of uniformly 
interpreting whether ne exeat rights constitute rights of custody under 
the Hague Convention.173 This emphasis on uniformity is not 
unwarranted, as there is a recognized notion that ―uniformity of 
interpretation is inherent in the design of treaties.‖174 The necessity 
for judicial uniformity in treaty interpretation naturally follows from 
the fact that a treaty is founded upon ―a single, uniform content 
shaped by the mutual design of the treaty parties.‖175 
In an effort to facilitate uniformity in treaty interpretation, the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) 
prescribes methods for treaty construction.176 Specifically, the Vienna 
Convention states that ―[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.‖177 It 
also provides that in determining the context for the purpose of 
interpretation of a treaty, certain other documents may also be 
considered.178  
Based on these foundational principles of treaty interpretation, a 
court must first look to the text of the Hague Convention to construe 
the meaning of custody rights and access rights. The treaty‘s 
definitions provide little clarity on the scope of these terms.179 In fact, 
as the Court in Abbott noted, the Hague Convention specifically 
failed to define custody in precise terms or refer to the laws of 
 
 172. E.g., In re Marriage of Resina [1991] FamCA 33, ¶ 22 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/family_ct/1991/33.html. 
 173. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1991 (―This uniform, text-based approach ensures international 
consistency in interpreting the Convention.‖).  
 174. Michael Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call 
for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L. J. 1885, 1937 (2005). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 177. Id. art. 31. 
 178. Id. Such documents include: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties 
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was 
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
Id. 
 179. See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 5. 
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different nations pertaining to parental rights.180 Other important 
terms, such as habitual residence, are not defined in the Hague 
Convention at all.181 Therefore, the Hague Convention‘s text lacks 
guidance, which has ―important implications for certain terms.‖182 
Looking then to the objects and purpose of the Hague 
Convention, Article 1 states that the Convention‘s objects are: ―a) to 
secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or 
retained in any Contracting State; and b) to ensure that rights of 
custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are 
effectively respected in the other Contracting States.‖183 To give 
effect to these purposes, Article 7 of the Convention provides that 
―[c]entral Authorities shall co-operate with each other and promote 
co-operation amongst the competent authorities in their respective 
States to secure the prompt return of children and to achieve the other 
objects of this Convention.‖184 Article 21, which concerns rights of 
access, also notes that, ―[t]he Central Authorities, either directly or 
through intermediaries, may initiate or assist in the institution of 
proceedings with a view to organizing or protecting these rights and 
securing respect for the conditions to which the exercise of these 
rights may be subject.‖185 The Perez-Vera Report further underlies 
the Hague Convention‘s objectives of co-operation, stating that it ―is 
above all a convention which seeks to prevent the international 
removal of children by creating a system of close co-operation 
among the judicial and administrative authorities of the Contracting 
States.‖186  
There is a common theme of co-operation and respect between 
Contracting States. This notion does not lead to a conclusion that ne 
exeat rights always constitute rights of custody. As previously 
indicated, ne exeat rights have been granted by courts in different 
contexts for a variety reasons. This explicit theme of respect and the 
uncertainty about the scope of the rights of custody lends itself to the 
conclusion that there need not be a general international acceptance 
of whether ne exeat rights constitute rights of custody under the 
 
 180. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1995 (citing the Perez-Vera Report, supra note 139, at 446–48. 
 181. Vivatvaraphol, supra note 4, at 3340.  
 182. Id. 
 183. Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 1 (emphasis added). 
 184. Id. art. 7 (emphasis added). 
 185. Id. art. 21 (emphasis added). 
 186. PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 139, at 435 (emphasis added).  
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Hague Convention. Rather, it appears that based on the Hague 
Convention‘s text, courts must take into account the varying contexts 
in which the clause was included in the custody agreement when 
determining whether a parent‘s ne exeat right constituted a right of 
custody. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Abbott v. Abbott, rather than framing the issue in a case-
specific manner, the Court posed the underlying issue as whether ne 
exeat rights constitute ―rights of custody‖ under the Hague 
Convention.187 While the Court focused on creating a uniform and 
consistent standard to apply in Hague Convention cases involving ne 
exeat rights, it misconstrued the Convention‘s objectives and 
ultimately rendered an overly broad decision that contradicts the text 
of the treaty itself.188  
 
 
 187. See supra Part IV.A. 
 188. See supra Part IV.C. 
